The Accountable Care Fiasco

The Accountable Care Fiasco

That’s what the Wall Street Journal calls the state of developing real-world guidelines for “the Accountable Care Organizations that are supposed to be the crown jewel of cost-saving reform.”

The theory for ACOs, as they’re known, is that hospitals, primary-care doctors and specialists will work more efficiently in teams, like at the Mayo Clinic and other top U.S. hospitals. ACOs are meant to fix health care’s too-many-cooks predicament. The average senior on Medicare sees two physicians and five specialists, 13 on average for those with chronic illnesses. Most likely, those doctors aren’t coordinating patient care.

This fragmentation is largely an artifact of Medicare’s price control regime: The classic case study is Duke University Hospital, which cut the costs of treating congestive heart failure by 40% but then dumped the integration program because it lost money under Medicare’s fee schedule.

A patient and doctor at Geisinger Medical Center, one of the physician groups that the ACO rule is based on.

By changing the way it pays, Medicare under the ACO rule is effectively mandating a new business model for practicing medicine. The vague cost-control hope is that ACOs will run pilot programs like Duke’s and the successful ones will become best practices. While the program is voluntary for now, the government’s intention is to make it mandatory in the coming years.

But what if they had an ACO revolution and no one showed up? The American Medical Group Association, a trade association of multispeciality practice groups and other integrated providers, calls the rule recently drafted by the Department of Health and Human Services “overly prescriptive, operationally burdensome, and the incentives are too difficult to achieve.” In a survey of its members, 93% said they won’t enroll.

Read the full article here.